The Hit Rate of Texas Recruiting Classes

Looking back at recruiting classes can be a difficult process. How do you grade them (based solely on college performance and what they did at Texas?), when exactly do you grade them (at the end of four years or five years, or even further out), etc?

Well, hindsight is 20/20 as they say.

To remove any ambiguity, I developed this retrospective solely on players who played in the NFL (does not include taxi/practice squad) and take into consideration roster attrition.

2011 (21 signees/3 NFL players) - RB, Malcolm Brown; DB, Quandre Diggs; DB, Mykkele Thompson

Evaluation Rate: 3/21 = 14.29% (No. of players who made the NFL divided by number of signees)

Hit Rate: 3/21 = 14.29% (No. of players who finished their careers at Texas and made the NFL divided by number of signees)

Notes: The demise of Mack Brown can be directly tied to his final five recruiting classes. Both the 2009 and 2010 recruiting classes also had just three players make the NFL. Brown, at the time, was truly selecting the players he and his staff wanted. They did not do a good job overall. 

2012 (28 signees/6 NFL players) - DT, Malcom Brown; OL, Donald Hawkins; DT, Hassan Ridgeway; CB, Duke Thomas; DB, Adrian Colbert (transfer out); WR, Marcus Johnson

Evaluation Rate: 6/28 = 21.42%

Hit Rate: 5/28 = 17.86%

Notes: Better numbers made the league here but as a percentage it was still way too slight. Adrian Colbert became one of only two Mack Brown transfers who eventually made the NFL from elsewhere (JaMarcus Webb was the other).

2013 (15 signees/4 NFL players) - OL, Kent Perkins; OL, Desmond Harrison (transfer out); TE, Geoff Swaim; ATH, Montrel Meander (transfer out)

Evaluation Rate: 4/15 = 26.67%

Hit Rate: 2/15 = 13.33%

2014 (23 signees/4 NFL players) - DE, Derick Roberson (transfer out); DT, Poona Ford; TE, Andrew Beck; RB, D'Onta Foreman

Evaluation Rate: 4/23 = 17.39%

Hit Rate: 3/23 = 13.04%

Notes: Transition class from Mack Brown to Charlie Strong. Only one of Strong's recruits from the month of January ended up being an NFL player - Poona Ford.

2015 (27 signees/8 NFL players) - LB, Malik Jefferson; DB, Holton Hill; DB, Kris Boyd; DB, DeShon Elliott; DL, Charles Omenihu; OL, Connor Williams; DB, PJ Locke; P, Michael Dickson

Evaluation Rate: 8/27 = 29.63%

Hit Rate: 8/27 = 29.63%

Notes: This was the best Texas class in nearly a decade and showed that Charlie Strong not only could recruit but his staff also ultimately had an eye for talent; Strong immediately doubled the Hit Rate of any of the previous eight years.

2016 (28 signees/7 NFL players) - WR, Devin Duvernay, DB, Brandon Jones; DT, Jordan Elliott (transfer out); WR, Collin Johnson; DL, Malcom Roach; QB, Shane Buechele (transfer out); WR, LJ Humphrey

Evaluation Rate: 7/28 = 25%

Hit Rate = 5/28 = 17.86%

Notes: Yet again, Strong showed a relatively strong eye for talent. But his poor on-field performance hurt his recruiting some. 

2017 (18 signees/4 NFL players) - QB, Sam Ehlinger; DL, TaQuon Graham; OL, Sam Cosmi; DB, Josh Thompson

Evaluation Rate: 4/18 22.22%

Hit Rate: 4/18 22.22%

Notes: Transition Class from Strong to Tom Herman. Like Strong, Herman only added one new signee that would eventually become an NFL player - Sam Cosmi.

2018 (27 signees/11 NFL players) - DB, Caden Sterns; LB, DeMarvion Overshown; DT, Keondre Coburn; DL, Moro Ojomo; DE, Joe Ossai; CB, D'Shawn Jamison; RB, Keontay Ingram (transfer out); OL, Christian Jones; K, Cameron Dicker; DB, Jalen Green (transfer out); QB Cameron Rising (transfer out) (Players in italics have yet to be selected in NFL draft and make an NFL team)

Evaluation Rate: 11/27 = 40.74%

Hit Rate: 8/27 = 29.63%

Notes: This is the class that should have helped put Tom Herman over the top. Despite recruiting rankings to the contrary, he and his staff simply couldn't put two good classes together back-to-back.

2019 (28 signees/6 NFL players) - WR, Bru McCoy (transfer out); WR, Jordan Whittington; S, Tyler Owens (transfer out); RB, Roschon Johnson; TE, Jared Wiley (transfer out); DT, T'Vondre Sweat

Evaluation Rate: 6/28 = 21.43%

Hit Rate: 3/28 = 10.71%

Notes: Look at the lowest Hit Rate of the decade. Even Mack Brown's last classes didn't miss on this many. This is part of the reason why Steve Sarkisian was saddled early with a lack of NFL talent. Attrition clearly played a role here but so did evaluation.

2020 (22 signees/8 NFL players) - RB, Bijan Robinson; DL, Alfred Collins; ATH, Ja'Quinden Jackson (transfer out); OL, Jake Majors; DB, Jahdae Barron; LB, Jaylan Ford; DB Brenden Schooler; WR Tarik Black

Evaluation Rate: 8/22 =36.36%

Hit Rate: 7/22 = 25.93%

Notes: A solid class. The evaluation and hit rate are buoyed by the additions of Schooler and Black as transfers and Black never really did much as a Longhorn.

**

NFL Hit Rates of elite programs should average in the 25-35% range, so that's what Texas should focus on achieving. Yet the Horns matched or surpassed that figure just three times in 10 years. And the Horns barely averaged 25% from just an "Evaluation Rate", which doesn't take into account attrition/transfers.

Overall, poor depth and lack of top-end talent riddled Texas for much of the 2010s.

So did recruiting inconsistency. Poor years for Strong in 2016 and Herman in 2019 perhaps showed that neither could sustain success at Texas.

10-year average Evaluation Rate: 25.56%

10-year average Hit Rate: 19.45%

**

A quick look into the 2021, 2022 and 2023 classes thus far.

First, like his predecessors, Sark added at least one NFL player in his first month on the job in the 2021 class - Xavier Worthy. However, Sark also added Keilan Robinson who has a chance at the NFL as well. (Note to athletic administrators who make coaching changes: adding NFL players late in the process is just unlikely no matter who the coach is.)

As for the 2022 class, Sark's group looks on par if not better than both Herman's and Strong's second classes, which attracted eight and 11 NFL players, respectively.

The third class is where Sark diverges from Herman and Strong. While both Strong and Herman spiraled downward with third class, Sark is drastically different.

His third recruiting class was nothing short of outstanding. In fact, early returns suggest his 2023 recruiting class will be Sark's best yet.